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Abstract 
This paper examines the utopian and dystopian discourses surrounding the Main Channel of the Danube Valley, often 
referred to as the ‘Cursed Channel’, which flows through the eastern floodplain of the Danube southward across the 
Great Hungarian Plain. Plans for the channel were originally drawn up at the end of the nineteenth century during the 
era of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but the channel was only completed after the dissolution of the monarchy in the 
1920s. The debates concerning the social and ecological aspects of this project were part of the broader political 
discourse about modernity, traditionalism and conservation in Hungary. The scheme was first publicly termed the 
Cursed Channel in 1937 by a politician from the region, Lajos Dinnyés, who later served as Hungary's prime minister 
for a brief period after World War II. By the late 1940s, with the rise of Soviet influence, Hungary was caught up in the 
sovietization of science and policy, including water management. In the wake of the gradual communist takeover of 
Hungary, the epithet of the Cursed Channel gained new currency, influencing discourse on local implementations of 
the Great Stalin Plan for the Transformation of Nature. Tracing the history of the channel and people's perceptions of 
it, the paper illuminates the construction of a hydrosocial dystopia, and explores the dialectics of utopian and 
dystopian imaginations of hydrosocial landscapes. We argue that dystopian and utopian geographical imaginaries 
connected to the Cursed Channel were influential in the transformations of landscape and hydrosocial governance in 
twentieth century Hungary. 
 
Walking along the nature trails across the wetlands conserved in the Kiskunság National 
Park, one might notice information signs that mention the striking name of the neighbouring 
channel: ‘Átokcsatorna’, that is, the ‘Cursed Channel’.1 This name refers to the Main Channel of 
the Danube Valley (Duna-völgyi főcsatorna, hereafter: DVCS), which was built in the 1910s and 
1920s to drain the lower Danube-Tisza Interfluve; it flows through the eastern floodplain of the 
Danube southward across the Great Hungarian Plain, beginning close to Budapest and joining 
the Danube in the town of Baja (Fig. 1). Recent decades have witnessed a significant increase in 
public appreciation of remaining wetlands worldwide.2 In the area, a growing number of 
wetlands have come under official protection since the 1970s, and several wetland restorations 
                                                          
1 The Hungarian name itself is ambiguous: the compound ‘Átok-csatorna’ can mean both that the channel is cursed 
and − maybe even more so − that the channel itself is the curse. We chose to use the first meaning because it sounds 
more natural in English. 
2 H. Prince, Wetlands of the American Midwest: A Historical Geography of Changing Attitudes, Chicago, 1997; G.V.T. 
Matthews, The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands: its History and Development, Gland, 1993. 
have been carried out.3 Despite conservation efforts, however, by the early 1980s there was a 
severe decline in the level of groundwater in the region, which threatened the sustainability of 
several lakes and fens.4 Today the channel is blamed for destroying the wetlands, which are now 
perceived as a valuable part of Hungary's natural heritage. For much of the twentieth century, 
however, transforming nature by draining wetlands and irrigating drier territories was seen as a 
necessary part of ‘progress’ in order to increase agricultural productivity.5 This paper examines 
the history of the DVCS and its surrounding wetlands, from the first plans for the channel in the 
Austro-Hungarian period at the end of the nineteenth century, through the completion of the 
drainage scheme in the interwar years of an independent but much diminished Kingdom of 
Hungary, to the irrigation projects of the post-1945 communist era (Fig. 2). By focusing on the 
evolution of the channel's perceptions and the discourses surrounding each stage of its 
development, the paper aims to contribute to the general understanding of the political ecology 
of hydrosocial governance in Hungary.  
The case of the Cursed Channel suggests that political projects are inevitably 
environmental projects, and that conversely, environmental projects cannot escape being 
entangled in politics.6 Hence, following Erik Swyngedouw, the social and political context behind 
the contested meanings of nature should be viewed and investigated as the hybrid 
entanglements of culture and nature, or hydrology and society.7 As suggested by Rutgerd 
Boelens and others, hydrosocial territories are understood as ‘the contested imaginary and 
socio-environmental materialization of a spatially bound multi-scalar network in which humans, 
water flows, ecological relations, hydraulic infrastructure, financial means, legal-administrative 
arrangements and cultural institutions and practices are interactively defined, aligned and 
mobilized through epistemological belief systems, political hierarchies and naturalizing 
discourses’.8 From our point of view, the ‘Cursed Channel’ can be analysed as an example of a 
contested imaginary, and as a vehicle to influence and manipulate discourses about hydrosocial 
territories. Such an approach is valuable and illuminating, given that polarized rhetoric that 
reduces options to either a ‘blessing or curse’ is not uncommon even today in discussions about 
water management.9 These sorts of polarized labels expose the utopian/dystopian thinking 
behind hydromodernization and the control of water in general. Other scholars have already 
emphasized the role of the geographical imaginary in transformations of hydrosocial landscapes, 
and the connections between conceptual and material transformations.10 In addition to 
highlighting the significance of utopian ideas such as utopian hydraulism or hydraulic heroes, 
studies on the evolution of hydromodernization have also drawn attention to the power of crisis 
narratives.11 However, there is no reference in the literature to hydrosocial dystopias, while the 
                                                          
3 A. Iványosi-Szabó, Ahogy elkezdődött d a természetvédelem előzményei a Duna−Tisza közén, in: A. Iványosi-Szabó 
(Ed.), A Kiskunsági Nemzeti Park Igazgatóság Negyven Éve, Kecskemét, 2015, 11−16. 
4 B. Kohán and J. Szalai, Spatial analysis of the shallow groundwater level monitoring network in the Danube-Tisza 
Ridge using semivariograms, Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 63 (2014) 379−400. 
5 Similarly to colonial Mexico: A. Sluyter, The making of the myth in postcolonial development: material-conceptual 
landscape transformation in sixteenth-century Veracruz, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 89 
(1999) 394. 
6 E. Swyngedouw, Liquid Power: Contested Hydro-Modernities in Twentieth-Century Spain, Cambridge, 2015, 1−37. 
7 W. Cronon, Introduction: in search of nature, in: W. Cronon (Ed.), Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place 
in Nature, New York, 1996, 23−56; B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, Cambridge, 1993; S. Whatmore, Hybrid 
Geographies, London, 2002. 
8 R. Boelens, J. Hoogesteger, E. Swyngedouw, J. Vos, and P. Wester, Hydrosocial territories: a political ecology 
perspective, Water International 41 (2016) 1. 
9 J. van Schilfgaarde, Irrigation − a blessing or a curse, Agricultural Water Management 25 (1994) 203−219; Dams − 
blessing or curse?, WWF, http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/footprint/water/dams_initiative/ last accessed 30 
January 2017; D. Tadesse, The Nile: Is it a curse or blessing?, Institute for Security Studies Papers 174 (2008) 1−27. 
10 M. Kaika, Dams as symbols of modernization: the urbanization of nature between geographical imagination and 
materiality, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 96 (2006) 276−301; Sluyter, The making of the myth 
in postcolonial development. 
11 R. Boelens and N.C.P. Uiterweer, Hydraulic heroes: the ironies of utopian hydraulism and its politics of autonomy in 
the Guadalhorce Valley, Spain, Journal of Historical Geography 41 (2013) 44−58; C. Brannstrom and John Shary, 
Charles Pease and contested irrigation landscapes in early-twentieth-century South Texas, Journal of Historical 
dialectics of utopian and dystopian imaginations of hydrosocial landscapes are rarely addressed 
directly.12 Taking a historical political ecology approach, our goal is to shed light on the role of 
utopian/dystopian imaginaries in the socionatural transformation of landscapes, with particular 
focus on hydrosocial dystopias.13 The use of the term the ‘Cursed Channel’, which was coined in 
the 1930s, has been tracked in order to grasp both the dystopian and the utopian visions 
connected to the scheme of the DVCS. Our main task is to illustrate how the rearrangement of 
hydrosocial territories has been linked to contesting utopian/dystopian imaginaries in 
twentieth-century Hungary.  
Utopias and dystopias are predominantly defined as literary genres describing imagined 
good or bad places with an ideal or flawed constitution.14 Utopias and dystopias are not neutral; 
they have a political message. Whereas utopias challenge the present by providing alternative 
futures for the way in which relations between environment, technology and society are 
organized, dystopias, usually identified as anti-utopias, envision failed utopian aspirations.15 
Gregory Claeys argues that dystopias are most commonly understood as the failed utopias of 
twentieth-century totalitarianism, and highlights three typical forms of dystopia: the political 
dystopia, the environmental dystopia, and the technological dystopia.16 In critical notions 
surrounding utopias of modern hydrosocial landscapes all three of these aspects can be found, 
and are typically expressed as intersecting critiques of power, environmental effects and the 
fallibility of technology. In our analysis we try to explore this plurality of the utopian/dystopian 
imaginary.17 
As Denis Cosgrove has pointed out, the control and appropriation of water can be 
perceived as an imitation of divine mastery over nature.18 Modernization projects extend the 
human control of nature by applying new technological means, but modern technocratic utopias 
themselves can easily turn into dystopias in the case of unexpected environmental risks or 
blindness towards society. While many studies shed important light on these very risks and 
blind spots, the relationship of hegemonic power to hydro management has also been 
investigated by various scholars.19 Water engineering projects in particular often become 
hotspots of resistance against power.20 From a critical environmental point of view, formerly 
celebrated water engineering megaprojects have come in for substantial criticism, in part for 
their harmful and irreversible ecological consequences, but also because of the unequally shared 
environmental risks and benefits and the general neglect of local social and environmental 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Geography 38 (2012) 234−246. For more about crisis narratives see: D.K. Davis, The Arid Lands: History, Power, 
Knowledge, Cambridge, 2016, 166; Swyngedouw, Liquid Power, 40−45. 
12 E. Swyngedouw, Modernity and hybridity: nature, regeneracionismo, and the production of the Spanish waterscape, 
1890−1930, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 89 (1999) 443−465; Swyngedouw, Liquid Power. 
13 D.K. Davis, Historical approaches to political ecology, in: T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy (Eds), The 
Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology, London, 2015, 263−275. 
14 L.T. Sargent, Utopianism: A Very Short Introduction, New York, 10−32. 
15 Sargent, Utopianism, 100; G. Claeys, Dystopia: A Natural History, Oxford, 2017, 5; G. Claeys, News from somewhere: 
enhanced sociability and the composite definition of utopia and dystopia, History 98 (2013) 145−173. 
16 Claeys, Dystopia, 5; B. Stableford, Ecology and dystopia, in: G. Claeys (Eds), The Cambridge Companion to Utopian 
Literature, Cambridge, 2010, 259−281. 
17 G. Baeten, The spaces of utopia and dystopia: introduction, Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography 84 
(2002) 141−142. For more about the postmodern pluralizing imperative, see D.N. Livingstone, Geographical 
traditions, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 20 (1995) 420−422. 
18 D. Cosgrove, An elemental division: water control and engineered landscape, in: D. Cosgrove and G. Petts (Eds), 
Water, Engineering and Landscape: Water Control and Landscape Transformation in the Modern Period, London, 
1990, 1−11. 
19 M. Nüsser, Technological hydroscapes in Asia: the large dams debate reconsidered, in: M. Nüsser (Ed.), Large Dams 
in Asia: Contested Environments between Technological Hydroscapes and Social Resistance, Dodrecht, 2013, 1−14; 
K.A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power, New Haven, 1957; D. Worster, Rivers of 
Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West, New York, 1985; Swyngedouw, Liquid Power; J. Imlay 
and E.D. Carter, Drainage on the Grand Prairie: the birth of a hydraulic society on the Midwestern frontier, Journal of 
Historical Geography 38 (2012) 109−122. 
20 N.R. Muižnieks, The Daugavpils hydro station and ‘Glasnost’ in Latvia, Journal of Baltic Studies 18 (1987) 63−70; T. 
Fleischer, Jaws on the Danube: water management, regime change and the movement against the Middle Danube 
Hydroelectric Dam, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 17 (1993) 429−443. 
diversity.21 In social and political debates about technology, ecology and power, dystopian and 
utopian imageries are used to anchor contesting positions. Dystopias of empty wastelands or 
damaged hydrosocial landscapes, for example, are often countered by utopias of ideally-
governed landscapes.22  
The tumultuous history of twentieth-century Hungary offers a unique opportunity to 
follow the rearranged governance of hydrosocial territories, and the role of utopian and 
dystopian imaginations in these processes. We trace the DVCS scheme's history from its initial 
plans in the late nineteenth century to the completion of the ‘conquest of swampland’ in the 
interwar period, and the extension of the scheme by irrigation projects in sovietized Hungary, 
fuelled by local adaptations of the Great Stalin Plan for the Transformation of Nature.23 Our 
analysis is mainly based on contemporary published texts, such as newspaper articles, scientific 
works, parliamentary protocols, pamphlets and maps.24 In addition, we searched for materials in 
several Hungarian archives, and conducted oral history interviews. Compared to the existing 
historiography of the DVCS, this paper places special emphasis on the political aspirations and 
cultural values behind the scheme in the long-term perspective and illuminates the construction 
and altering characteristics of a hydrosocial dystopia.25 
‘A new conquest’ − utopian plans for the construction 
A broad section of the Great Hungarian Plain was regularly flooded before the expansive 
programme of river regulation, which peaked in the nineteenth century.26 During this period, 
proposals for river regulation in the Kingdom of Hungary, which was part of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy, represented the largest such schemes in Europe.27 Accordingly, river 
regulation became a symbol of Hungarian modernism and the nation's political will for 
development through the regulation of nature.28 After completing the channelization and 
embankment of the two main rivers, the Tisza and the Danube, the task of draining the inland 
swamps, including the marshes of the Danube-Tisza Interfluve, was left for a later phase.29 Here, 
a large wetland area of approximately sixty thousand hectares, fed mainly by rain and 
groundwater, was left intact by the regulation of the Danube.30 These wetlands, spanning a 
distance of over a hundred kilometres from north to south, had very diverse ecological 
                                                          
21 Local, small-scale environmental and water management practices are gaining increased attention: F. Berkes, J. 
Colding, and C. Folke, Rediscovery of traditional ecological knowledge as adaptive management, Ecological 
Applications 10 (2000) 1251−1262; C. Pahl-Wostl, Transitions towards adaptive management of water facing climate 
and global change, Water Resources Management 21 (2007) 49−62; examples of local traditional water management 
practices in Hungary: B. Andrásfalvy, Vízhaszonvétel és árvízvédelem hagyománya Magyarországon, Magyar 
Tudomány 6 (2000) 709−720. Changes of water management's perception in Hungary: R. Győri, Vadvíziországtól 
fokgazdálkodásig, Korall 1 (2000) 20−26. 
22 M.W. Ertsen, Colonial irrigation: myths of emptiness, Landscape Research 31 (2006) 147−167. On governance, see 
Boelens, Hoogesteger, Swyngedouw, Vos, and Wester, Hydrosocial territories, 6−7. 
23  Swyngedouw, Liquid Power, 44−51; S. Brain, The Great Stalin Plan for the Transformation of Nature, 
Environmental History 15 (2010) 670−699; Z. Hajdú, A szocialista természetátalakítás kérdései 
Magyarországon,1948−1956, in: A. Kiss, G. Mezősi, and Z. Sümeghy (Eds), Táj, Környezet és Társadalom: Ünnepi 
Tanulmányok Keveiné Bárány Ilona Professzor Asszony Tiszteletére, Szeged, 2006, 245−258; Z. Borvendég and M. 
Palasik, Untamed seedlings: Hungary and Stalin's plan for the transformation of nature, in: D. Olšáková (Ed.), In the 
Name of the Great Work: Stalin's Plan for the Transformation of Nature and its Impact in Eastern Europe, New York, 
2016, 126−225. 
24 The ADT Arcanum Digitheca was a very rich source: https://adtplus.arcanum.hu/en/ last accessed 30 May 2017. 
25 For example: D. Varga, Vizek Könyve, Budapest, 1976, 11−33; L. Fejér, Vizeink Krónikája, Budapest, 2001, 
186−187; Z. Károlyi, A Duna-völgy vizeinek szabályozása, in: D. Ihrig (Ed.), A Magyar Vízszabályozás Története, 
Budapest, 1973, 225−233. 
26 D. Ihrig, A magyar medence vízrajza, in: D. Ihrig (Ed.), A Magyar Vízszabályozás Története, 1973, 13−19. 
27 Z. Pinke, Modernization and decline: an eco-historical perspective on regulation of the Tisza Valley, Hungary, 
Journal of Historical Geography 45 (2014) 93. 
28 Z. Pinke, Modernization and decline. 
29 Z. Károlyi, A Magyar vízi munkálatok rövid története különös tekintettel a vizek szabályozására, in: Ihrig (Ed.), A 
Magyar Vízszabályozás Története, 50−136. 
30 Károlyi, A Duna-völgy vizeinek szabályozása, 225−233. 
characteristics, ranging from soda pans with high alkalinity to freshwater marshes and peaty 
fens, separated from each other by sand dunes and arable lands.31 Wetlands were mainly used 
adaptively by local inhabitants for grazing livestock, reed cutting, fishing, egg collecting, and 
hunting. 32  Intensive agriculture was hindered by the local and regional discharge of 
groundwater flowing into the area.33  
An integrative regional water regulation plan from the 1850s is known today only via 
indirect reports, while the earliest surviving plan dates from 1898.34 By creating a main channel 
on the left side of the Danube Valley, with a connected system of side channels, a huge territory 
was targeted for drainage; irrigation also formed part of the original plan (Fig. 3).35 One of the 
authors of the plan, the engineer Elek Zlinszky, expressed his feelings about the wet landscape 
with these words:  
The question arises very often, particularly from strangers who are travelling through the country in the 
springtime, seeing practically nothing other than water and water, what is the reason why such a huge 
terrain is an unused wasteland? A person familiar with local conditions must shamefacedly admit that there 
is no reason other than the indifference of landowners to the issue. It is indeed incomprehensible that when, 
in the most secluded provinces of the countryside, much progress is made in this regard that near the capital 
of the country more than a hundred thousand holds [57,500 ha] of swampland is tolerated .... Our aim is to 
win this large, practically completely useless territory in the heart of the country for civilization, as soon as 
possible.36  
In this excerpt, there is a sense of mission, even of heroic modernization, for the country, 
and a strong revolt against inaction. For modernizers like Zlinszky, swampland embodied the 
polar opposite of culture and civilization: it was health hazard, an obstacle to modern 
transportation and a hindrance to agriculture. This is a vision of a ‘pathological’, underdeveloped 
landscape as seen by an ‘objective’ traveller, a landscape whose transformation is a moral 
crusade.37 In Zlinszky's view, inland drainage was a continuation of the heroic work of river 
regulation in the process of building modern Hungary.  
Work on the DVCS only began in 1909, following the formation of the Danube Valley 
Drainage and Irrigation Association, and construction was delayed several times even after 
this.38 The digging itself did not start until 1912, construction was slow, and the outbreak of 
                                                          
31 M. Biró, A. Révész, Z. Molnár and F. Horváth, Regional habitat pattern of the Danube-Tisza Interfluve in Hungary, I: 
the landscape structure and habitat pattern; the fen and alkali vegetation, Acta Botanica Hungarica 49 (2007) 
267−303; M. Biró, A. Iványosi-Szabó and Z. Molnár, A Duna−Tisza köze tájtörténete, in: A. Iványosi-Szabó (Ed.), A 
Kiskunsági Nemzeti Park Igazgatóság Negyven Éve, 51−52. 
32 Varga, Vizek Könyve, 11−33. For the importance of ‘wet farming’ in Hungary, see T. Bellon, Living together with 
nature. Farming on the river flats in the valley of the Tisza, Acta Ethnographica Hungarica 49 (2004) 243−256. 
33 J. Mádlné Szőnyi and J. Toth, A hydrogeological type section for the Duna-Tisza interfluve, Hungary, Hydrogeology 
Journal 17 (2009) 961−980. 
34 A Duna-völgyi-főcsatorna Terve, Budapest, 1899; E. Zlinszky, Műszaki Leírás a Pest-megyei Dunavölgy Lecsapolási 
és Öntözési Tervéhez, Budapest, 1899. 
35 For Fig. 3, the 1941 map by Béla Lupkovics has been georeferenced and redrawn using ArcGIS 10.1. The channel 
system has not been changed, but the settlements, roads and railway lines, and the course of the Danube have been 
revised according to Military Topographic Survey 1940−1944 (georeferenced and published by Arcanum Ltd and HM 
HIM on DVD: Magyarország Topográfiai Térképei a Második Világháború Időszakából, Budapest, 2008). The 
inundation area indicated on Lupkovics's map covers not only marshes and fens, but the less frequently flooded wet 
meadows as well. 
36 Zlinszky, Műszaki Leírás, 8; The hold (or kataszteri hold) is a unit of area that equals 57.55 ha. 
37 For a tropical parallel to the aesthetics and hermeneutics of ‘pathologized’ swamplands, see D.N. Livingstone, 
Tropical hermeneutics and the climatic imagination, in: D.N. Livingstone (Ed.) Science, Space and Hermeneutics, 
Heidelberg, 2002, 43−73. For malaria control and development see E.D. Carter, Malaria control in the Tennessee 
Valley Authority: health, ecology, and metanarratives of development, Journal of Historical Geography 43 (2014) 
111−127. 
38 The formation of Water Associations at this time was regulated by the ‘Water Law’, Act XXIII of 1885 (the texts of 
the referenced Acts of Parliament are available at Articles in the Codex of Hungarian Laws, http://www.1000ev.hu  
last accessed 30 January 2017). Membership of the Danube Valley Drainage and Irrigation Association consisted 
mainly of small and medium landowners and municipal properties; larger, aristocratic landowners like the Coburg-
Koháry family or the imperial royal family were few and in the minority in terms of the number of votes they had. 
Hivatali és ügyviteli iratok (Pestvármegyei Dunavölgy Lecsapoló és Öntöző Társaság), Pest County Archives, 
Budapest, IX.314 a. Under the terms of the Water Act, floodplain development taxes were imposed on landowners to 
cover the cost of construction and maintenance work. 
World War I hampered the project still further. Only thirty-two kilometres of channel were 
completed by 1918, the last year of the war.39 Following the war, the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
was dissolved and its Hungarian half endured a brief chaotic period of revolution, including a 
short-lived communist regime. When the Trianon Treaty formally ended the war in 1920, the 
Hungarian Kingdom shrank to one-third of its former size.40  
The desire to realize the Danube Valley's hydromodernization project was rekindled 
during the conservative-nationalist regime of Regent Miklós Horthy (1920−1944).41 Like ‘El 
Disastre’ for Spain in 1898, when it lost the last of its colonies, Trianon was perceived commonly 
as a national catastrophe and catalysed the Hungarian geographical imagination in many ways.42 
The main political goal of the Horthy regime was to restore Hungary to its former size, and to 
prove Hungary's political and cultural supremacy in the Carpathian Basin.43 With a geographical 
shift of perspective, the regime turned its interest to the wastelands and natural resources of the 
so-called ‘Truncated Country’, intending to implement modernist notions of natural resource 
management (and postpone crucial social land reform). 44  Drainage of the remaining 
swamplands as an inner conquest was presented as a cultural mission to expand the space of 
Hungarians within the new state borders. In 1920 a member of the National Assembly expressed 
his ‘cultural shame’ over the continued delay of the drainage and the ‘jungle’ of swamps in the 
middle of the country.45 Construction resumed in 1922, but as financial backing was not secure, 
progress was slaw.46 The digging work accelerated only after the state provided the Danube 
Valley Drainage and Irrigation Association with a substantial loan in 1925 and a new ministerial 
commissioner, the engineer Sándor Rohringer took office.47 For Rohringer the endeavours of 
water management ‘provided the brightest evidence of the cultural value of the Hungarian 
race’.48 One newspaper article, bearing the headline ‘The new conquest −  occupation of the 
swampland’, envisioned a technocratic utopia of cultural occupation and ‘golden wheat fields’ 
within a few years of the drainage scheme being completed (Fig. 4).49  
The drainage scheme was only finished in 1931, but due to the lack of finance the related 
irrigation system that was part of the original plan was not implemented.50 This was an 
economically difficult and politically charged period in Hungary, worsened by the worldwide 
                                                          
39 Károlyi, A Duna-völgy vizeinek szabályozása, 232. 
40 I. Romsics, Dismantling of Historic Hungary: the Peace Treaty of Trianon, 1920, New York, 2002. After the 
revolutions that took place in the early interwar period, the Hungarian state once more became a monarchy, although 
without a crowned monarch. 
41 B. Lupkovics, A Pestvármegyei Dunavölgy Lecsapoló és Öntöző Társulat Munkálatai és Jövő Feladatai, Budapest, 
1941, 3; Károlyi, A Duna-völgy vizeinek szabályozása, 232. 
42 Swyngedouw, Liquid Power, 2−3, 39−66. 
43 Belief in the so-called ‘Hungarian Cultural Advantage’ was common in Hungarian cultural politics and the politics of 
science in the period following the signing of the Treaty of Trianon. F. Gyuris, Human geography, cartography, and 
statistics: a toolkit for geopolitical goals in Hungary until World War II, Hungarian Cultural Studies 7 (2014) 
215−241. 
44 A significant proportion of Hungary's natural resources lay outside the newborders, so they were now unavailable 
to the Hungarian state. This led to the promotion of greater rationalization in the use of natural resources, such as the 
implementation of a new afforestation programme. Z. Hajdú, Táj és állam, in: G. Füleky (Ed.), A Táj Változásai a 
Honfoglalás óta a Kárpát-medencében, Gödöllő, 1997, 9−20. For a Spanish parallel of modernization as internal 
colonization, see: Swyngedouw, Liquid Power, 44−51. 
45  Jenő Szabóky addressing the House of Representatives, 8 February 1922, Parliamentary Documents, 
http://mpgy.ogyk.hu/ last accessed 30 January 2017. 
46 The Ministry of Agriculture granted a loan to the association, supported by Act XXV of 1922. 
47 The new loan was approved by the amendments made in Act IV of 1925. According to Act XLI of 1923, which 
overwrote the ‘Water Law’ of 1885, the Government Commissioner of a Water Association was authorized to a 
demand a loan without the consent of the association's assembly. 
48 Speech by Sándor Rohringer at the Hydraulic Engineering Department, Hungarian Association of Engineers and 
Architects, 22 March 1923; published in S. Rohringer, Vizgazdasági politikánk, Vízügyi Közlemények 9 (1923) 1−9. 
Compensational cultural politics and water management were similarly intertwined in early twentieth century Spain, 
in the case of the movement known as ‘regenerationism’: Boelens and Uiterweer, Hydraulic heroes; Swyngedouw, 
Modernity and hybridity. 
49 G. Nyulászi, Az új honfoglalás. Mocsárország meghódítása, Budapesti Hírlap, 6 December 1925. 
50 Rohringer Sándor levele az Alispán Úrnak, 20 December 1931, Archives of Environmental Protection and Water 
Management, Budapest [hereafter KvVL], 15.2 bb, Box 1. 
Great Depression. The combination of low grain prices, high levels of debt in the agricultural 
sector, and the cost of the scheme all meant that the channel drew considerable attention.51 
The Cursed Channel − Lajos Dinnyés leads mounting criticism 
Soon after its construction, the channel was the subject of mounting criticism and debate, 
due to several factors, namely the unintended environmental consequences, certain technical 
mistakes, as well as financial and legal problems. Politicians and journalists were involved in the 
discussions; one newsreel even depicted the channel flooding in 1936.52 The following two 
sections will outline how the construction's ostensible failure created an opportunity to criticize 
different stakeholders. Several − sometimes contradictory − discourses were advanced. 
According to oral histories, the affected landowners were divided in their views of the success of 
the channel scheme.53 Some argued that ‘it couldn't take the water away when it was supposed 
to, but it did take the water out of the soil when we needed it’. For others, the ‘swamps became 
fine soil’ and many new farms were built where previously cattle had been herded by boats and 
children had collected eggs.54 As the following chapters reveal, pictures of local inhabitants 
either ‘suffering from the channel’ or too ‘lazy to contribute’ were mobilized in the national 
discourses about the drainage scheme, which unsurprisingly became politically sensitive.55 As an 
ambitious opposition politician from the region, Lajos Dinnyés was highly critical of the scheme. 
Dinnyés articulated his views in a pamphlet, boosting the nationwide criticism of the channel 
(Fig. 5).56 By studying his arguments in this section, we gain insight into the main issues.  
Lajos Dinnyés was born in 1901 into a landed family of modest wealth.57 The newly built 
channel passed through his hometown, Dabas. After finishing his studies in agriculture he 
started his political career in the moderate Independent Smallholders Party (Független 
Kisgazdapárt).58 Thanks to his sociability and practical knowledge of agriculture Dinnyés quickly 
became popular, winning the local parliamentary election against the pro-government candidate 
in 1931.59 From this point on, he was heavily engaged with the issue of the channel. He 
negotiated with hundreds of landowners about problems related to the channel, and gave 
several speeches on the topic during his two terms in Parliament between 1931 and 1939.60 In 
1937, he was the first person in the assembly to use the phrase ‘Cursed Channel’. Before long, 
the name gained popularity among opposition politicians and was eagerly adopted by the 
newspapers.61 In 1937, Dinnyés's pamphlet, titled ‘The Cursed Channel’, summarized its history 
and his criticism of its construction and the government in general.62  
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61 Dinnyés first mentioned the ‘cursed channel of the Danube Valley Drainage and Irrigation Association’ on 10 March 
1937; on 11 June 1937 he refers to the channel, ‘about which I have already spoken, and which also entered common 
Despite his misgivings, Dinnyés did not question the basic need for the channel and for 
hydromodernization. He acknowledged the necessity of drainage because of the damage caused 
to agriculture by inland inundation, the health concerns arising from swamps, especially the risk 
of malaria, and finally, the need for better transportation overall. He also saw a need not just for 
drainage, but also for irrigation, primarily in drought-prone saline grasslands.63  
Dinnyés was, however, critical of the numerous technical, legal, and financial problems 
surrounding the construction of the channel. He demonstrated the harmful environmental 
effects of the scheme.64 On the one hand, it caused droughts by inducing groundwater-decline. 
On the other hand, the scheme generated floods that were less predictable, since the channel 
itself was prone to inundating large areas. In some years the region experienced both droughts 
and floods. In addition, there remained territories where the drainage was not effective, which 
suffered from inland inundation. He also blamed the channel for causing secondary 
salinization.65 Dinnyés underlined the economic losses faced by local farmers as a result of 
environmental problems.66 While newly cultivated fields failed to provide the anticipated 
increase in production, the transformation of former marshlands necessitated substantial 
additional manual labour, as well as material and financial input. Moreover, traditional practices 
of land management, involving the usage of reeds or wildlife, all declined after the drainage 
scheme had was implemented.  
He also accused the government of violating the law, first by granting the 1925 loan to 
the Danube Valley Drainage and Irrigation Association, and then by imposing this arbitrarily 
upon the stakeholders. Since the water association's assembly was suspended at that time, the 
government had acted without the association's support and against the interests of self-
governance.67 After the drainage scheme began, the many among the local population not only 
suffered the negative impacts of the channel but also had difficulty paying back the loan 
instalments to the government, especially as the extra profits promised from the drainage 
scheme never materialized.68  
In light of the immediate concerns raised by the completion of the drainage scheme, 
Dinnyés argued for a number of financial solutions, like delaying the payment of taxes and loan 
instalments, as well as technical solutions, such as increased capacities for runoff, sluices, and 
pumping stations. He stated that the construction of a new relief channel could mitigate the 
failures of the Cursed Channel by providing a solution for flood control and alleviating drought 
through irrigation.69 In advancing his arguments, Dinnyés employed hyperbolic and emotive 
rhetoric as he conjured up images of a dystopian landscape. The ‘poor Hungarians’ of the ‘Valley 
of Tears’ were suffering not only from environmental disasters such as droughts and floods and 
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D.P. Gamero, From private initiative to public intervention in Spanish water management: the case of the Muga and 
Fluvià rivers (1850−1930), Journal of Historical 
Geography 38 (2012) 220−233. 
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salinization, but also from an autocratic government unable to represent its own people in an 
‘age of crises’.70 
Conflicting perspectives of conservation, traditionalism and modernity 
Dinnyés's views of the DVCS were part of a wider debate about modernity and progress 
and their consequences on traditional life. The rise of a modern conservation movement made 
the debate even more complicated.71 In 1919 a leading Hungarian ornithologist, Jakab Schenk, 
had proposed founding a nature reserve in the northern wetlands of the Danube-Tisza 
Interfluve, justifying his proposal by pointing to the region's unique environmental 
characteristics.72 His modernistic vision of a nature reserve as a space for wildlife made it 
necessary in his mind to relocate the entire human population away from the territory, primarily 
because these people were, from his point of view, ‘the most dangerous poachers and egg 
collectors since ancient times’.73 His ideas mirrored the vision of those who promoted national 
parks in the American West as an uninhabited wilderness, where groups of people whose 
subsistence was derived from hunting and trapping were criminalized.74 Outside the core 
territory, Schenk imagined extensive grazing land with dairy farms combined with intensively 
cultivated arable plots supported by irrigation and modern fertilizer usage.75 The plan for a 
nature reserve had not been considered in plans for the channel system, as Károly Kaán, an 
influential nature conservationist from this time, lamented in his Nature Conservation and 
Natural Values.76 Botanists started to document the flora and vegetation of the wetlands before 
they were transformed forever by the drainage schemes.77  
These naturalists did not articulate their concerns as expressively as the journalist László 
Szalay. He argued that the drainage channel caused dramatic environmental consequences such 
as groundwater decline, secondary salinization, and even a change in climate, which made a 
dystopian ‘desert out of the Great Hungarian Plain’.78 Szalay, the son of a local landowner and 
also a keen hunter and amateur ethnographer, spent much of his time in the marshlands and 
was interested in the local peasants' points of view about the environment. In his writings, he 
pictured an anti-modern, Arcadian harmony of traditions, describing the wise adaptation of the 
local inhabitants to the wet environment: grazing at the deepest parts, mowing in the periphery 
of marshland and sowing root crops on the wet fields and cereals on the highest parts.79 He 
labelled the environmental consequences of the channel a ‘national catastrophe’, and pictured 
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the channel as draining the life-giving water of a ‘bleeding Hungary’. He claimed that, ‘There is 
no mortal enemy or pest for the Hungarians in all of Europe greater than this channel’.80 In 
contrast to Dinnyés, Szalay did not advocate technical corrections since he deemed it impossible 
to resolve the problem with further channels. Instead, he called for the complete destruction of 
the DVCS, provoking a storm of protest from the engineers.81  
It is noteworthy how the supporters of the channel reacted to these assaults. Rohringer, 
who was singled out for criticism by both Dinnyés and Szalay, started to study the groundwater 
of the region and, with the support of a governmental research grant, established the first 
groundwater-monitoring network in Hungary.82 He responded to the objections in scientific 
journals and newspaper articles, and argued that the groundwater decline was not critical and 
that fears of secondary salinization were unfounded.83 The channel was supported not only by 
water engineers, but also by a variety of scholars involved in research into soil amelioration and 
techniques of agrodevelopment, who usually took a cooperative approach towards the 
government. One was Elek ‘Sigmond, a well known soil scientist, who explained that the problem 
lay only in the work's lack of completion, and that drainage should be followed by modern 
amelioration.84 At Lake Kolon, experts in pedology and agrochemistry experimented with the 
cultivation of former wetlands using tree plantations, crops and hay meadows. The authors 
offered instructions to landowners on how to convert this backward ‘barren, boggy landscape’.85 
Experiments in soil improvement through irrigation and by utilizing chemicals were attempted 
near the town of Kunszentmiklós.86 Instead of highlighting the errors of the government, as 
Dinnyés did, some of the authors of these articles argued that the ‘Hungarian race’ should be 
more open and progressive to the changes and welcome the Green Field Movement (Zöldmező 
Mozgalom), which advocated the local introduction of new agricultural technologies.87 The 
issues of irrigation and flood control that formed part of Dinnyés's pamphlet were also discussed 
extensively. In the dry years of the 1930s nationwide debates prevailed about the 
‘desertification of the Great Hungarian Plain’ and about irrigation as a possible solution.88 In 
other parts of the country, new irrigation systems were built, but not in the Danube-Tisza 
Interfluve.89 In the wet years of the 1940s, however, the idea of extending drainage to the higher 
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parts of the interfluve emerged.90 After several floods of the DVCS, a relief channel was built in 
1944 to conduct surplus water to the Danube. In spite of this correction, discussions about the 
Cursed Channel continued.91 
‘The curse becomes a blessing’? − water management in a Sovietized 
Hungary 
Following the Second World War, water management assumed renewed significance in 
Hungarian politics. The party of Lajos Dinnyés, the Independent Smallholders' Party, won the 
elections and briefly became the governing party in a coalition after the first elections of the 
Hungarian Republic (1946−1949).92 The improvement of the DVCS was a prominent objective 
in the party's agenda. Local politicians from the town of Szabadszállás, which had a majority of 
Independent Smallholders' Party members on the local council, sent a deputation to Budapest to 
help determine the channel's water level in order to make it capable of providing irrigation even 
during dry summers.93 The government also took measures to improve irrigation on a national 
level. The construction of the long-planned national megaproject, the Danube-Tisza Canal, was 
initiated.94 This canal was planned not just to boost the postwar economy, but also to bring fresh 
water from the DVCS for irrigation. A rhetorical change was also evident in the media. Between 
1947 and 1948, the leftist newspaper Népszava published an article with the title ‘The curse 
becomes a blessing’, about the newly built irrigation channels. The same phrase was used in an 
article about the Danube-Tisza Canal − the scheme would lift the ‘curse’ through irrigation.95  
Before the new government was formed, Lajos Dinnyés was not a central figure in the 
Independent Smallholders' Party. Rather, he had regional influence as the head of the party 
organization in Pest County. However, enjoying the support of the Hungarian Communist Party, 
in 1945 he became the minister of defence and was appointed prime minister of Hungary on 31 
May 1947.96 Dinnyés retained his position after the August 1947 elections, which were 
manipulated by the Communist Party. In his inaugural speech he paid great attention to the 
Danube-Tisza Canal and its construction, discussing its water levels and the sluices which would 
enable the transport of freshwater to the Main Channel of the Danube Valley.97 After the speech, 
he was criticized in Parliament for caring more about unimportant details of the new Danube-
Tisza Canal than the ‘undemocratic situation in the country’, such as election rigging and the 
rising pressure on other parties.98 The country was under the de facto control of the Hungarian 
communists and the Soviet Union, even before Dinnyés's abrupt removal from office in 
December 1948.99  
Although the sovietization of Hungary was made explicit during the Stalinist Rákosi era 
(1948−1953), most of the political transformation had already begun under Dinnyés's prime 
ministership.100 Under Dinnyés's governance (1947−1948), the first three-year plan marked the 
                                                          
90 A DTMK 1942, május 3-i szegedi vízügyi nagygyűlésének határozatai, BKML IX.234, Box 70. 
91 Károlyi, A Duna-völgy vizeinek szabályozása, 232; C. Kósa, Átok-, vagy Áldáscsatorna? Beszélgetés Lupkovics 
Brunóval, Magyar Vízgazdálkodás 23 (1983) 16−18. 
92 Other parties in the coalition were the Hungarian Communist Party (Magyar Kommunista Párt), the Social 
Democratic Party (Szociáldemokrata Párt), and the National Peasant Party (Nemzeti Parasztpárt). 
93 Közgyűlési jegyzőkönyv mutatóval 1942−1950, Szabadszállás, 16 June 1947, BKML V.376/c, Tome 3. 
94 The Danube-Tisza Canal was never finished; just this short section was built by 1948. 
95 Áldás válik az átokból, Népszava, 21 December 1947, 15; Olcsó víziút, több termés, virágzó gazdaságok − a Duna-
Tisza-csatorna nyomán, Népszava, 6 June 1948. 
96 Somlyai, Dinnyés Lajos, 129−130; M. Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések 1940−1956, Budapest, 1997, 736−737; Szűcs, 
Dinnyés Lajos Első Kormányának Minisztertanácsi Jegyzőkönyvei, 14−20. 
97 Szűcs, Dinnyés Lajos Első Kormányának Minisztertanácsi Jegyzőkönyvei, 82−101, 91. 
98  Dezső Sulyok addressing the National Assembly, 12 June 1947, Parliamentary Documents, 
http://mpgy.ogyk.hu/last accessed 30 January 2017. Sulyok was excluded from the Independent Smallholders' Party 
by the party's left wing. Such exclusions frequently occurred due to pressure from the communists and their political 
technique of ‘slicing’. 
99 Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, 737. 
100 Somlyai, Dinnyés Lajos, 132. 
implementation of Soviet-style economic planning, with a goal of expanding the scale of 
irrigation. Not just banks and factories, but also the whole water management industry became 
state property, and thewater associations, including the Danube Valley Drainage and Irrigation 
Association, were abolished. These changes led to the restructuring of the entire system of water 
management.101  
The main mission of the economic plans was to modernize the country by following in 
the footsteps of the Soviet Union in order to outpace the modernization efforts of the previous 
‘accursed’ capitalist regime and to contribute to the realization of a utopian state of socialism.102 
By the end of 1940s, the grandiose vision of the Stalinist transformation of nature became 
official policy in Hungary. This meant not just the cultivation of new crops such as cotton or 
lemon, projects based on Lysenko's pseudoscientific theories of plant breeding, but also the 
implementation of old ideas of water control and soil amelioration.103 Irrigation practices 
developed by the Soviet Union in their fight against droughts were adopted by the Hungarian 
state, and in the 1950s a number of new channels were built and several other governmental 
irrigation and drainage projects were commenced.104 The plan overall was realized locally with 
the cooperation of newly formed collective farms and by the transformation of the salty 
lowlands into irrigated rice fields or fishing ponds, supplemented with soil amelioration 
experiments (Fig. 6).105 The Cursed Channel concept emerged in the media once again, and was 
presented as a channel which would become a blessing only through the construction of 
additional sluices and a more effective irrigation system.106  
After the death of Stalin and the end of the Rákosi regime in 1953, the intensity of the 
project for the transformation of nature declined, and yet, although some irrational plans were 
revised, the overall goal of hydromodernization remained uncontested. The 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution shed light on the people's discontent with the autocracy of the state. This revolution 
was repressed, but the leadership of János Kádár, the new General Secretary of the Hungarian 
Socialist Workers' Party, brought about a number of reforms to the highly centralized 
governance of the prerevolutionary period.107 In 1957, the decentralization of state-controlled 
water management took place, and a new set of so-called socialist water management 
associations were formed. Though these associations were declared to be ‘self-governing’, as 
part of the ‘socialist social system’ they were expected to cooperate with the compulsorily 
formed new collectives.108 Despite the organizational restructuring, the work of expanding the 
water control system continued (Fig. 7).  
Water management was not the only area which the socialist regime bent to its ideology. 
Cartography and the institutions of science in general were transformed in the first years of 
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state socialism and faced continuing pressure for as long as the regime lasted.109 Military maps 
and new surveys were undertaken by the restructured Defence Agency, while geography and 
agroenvironmental studies where subordinated to social economic plans.110 The use of the name 
Cursed Channel seems to have been strongly supported by the now socialist-led institutions. It 
appeared on official military maps, on the map of a school atlas, in pedology lecture notes, and 
on the pages of the official geographical journal Földrajzi Értesítő (Geographical Bulletin) (Fig. 
8).111 Due to the rising interest in the topic, in 1959 Dinnyés, who was no longer in the frontline 
of politics, republished his Cursed Channel pamphlet.112 The occurrence of this name on maps 
and scientific documents can be interpreted as a representation of the new power relations, 
indicating a conceptual transformation of the landscape.113 Yet usage of the name sheds light on 
the reformulation of networks of science and socialist environmental planning devoted to the 
material transformation of the landscape. In the 1960s, water control and drainage were 
extended to the upper parts of the Danube-Tisza Interfluve, and a new irrigation system was 
constructed near the Danube.114 These constructions attracted less attention than those in the 
1950s. After the consolidation of socialist Hungary and with the decay of the Stalinist plan for 
the transformation of nature, the Cursed Channel ceased to be a politically interesting issue and 
the name gradually fell into disuse. 
Conclusions 
The historical political ecology of the DVCS offers a unique insight into the changing 
perception of hydrosocial landscapes and the role of utopian/dystopian visions in the process of 
hydromodernization. After the scheme was completed in interwar Hungary, criticism of the 
project targeted its technical, environmental and political faults. Heated debates about the DVCS 
were part of the wider discourse about conservation, modernization and the fear of 
desertification in the Great Hungarian Plain. Landowners, engineers, journalists, naturalists and 
politicians were involved in the discussions about the scheme and about hydromodernization. 
Lajos Dinnyés played a crucial role in establishing the Cursed Channel narrative. The name took 
on a life of its own, however, in the struggle against drought in the 1930s and later in the 
postwar reorganizations of water management that were initiated under increasing communist 
influence. The dystopian Cursed Channel narrative was popularized and the improved scheme 
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came to be seen as a blessing after World War II, due to the irrigation programmes and 
Hungarian implementation of the Great Stalin Plan for the Transformation of Nature.  
The example of the Cursed Channel shows how the discourses surrounding water 
management projects were embedded in the shifting political context of twentieth-century 
Hungary, and how politics was inextricably interwoven with environmental and social criticism 
of the channel. Despite the dramatic political changes − such as the Trianon Treaty after World 
War I, the brief democratic period following World War II and the subsequent communist 
takeover d the aim of modernization through the control of water remained constant 
throughout. The drainage of wetlands and the fight against drought by irrigation continued in all 
three periods, but the governance of hydrosocial territories changed depending on the political 
regime: a plural territorial system of water management was centralized in 1948 and then 
decentralized in 1957. Utopian and dystopian ideas were mobilized in these reconfigurations of 
networks of power and governance.  
While examining this case, a fluid historical pattern of utopian and dystopian thought 
becomes apparent: an interwoven assemblage of technocratic utopias of modern landscapes and 
society, as well as dystopias of totalitarianism, compounded by technical and ecological 
dystopias. The utopian conquest of the swamplands failed due to its antidemocratic 
implementation, its multiple technical faults, and its unintended environmental effects, which 
conspired to create the hydrosocial dystopia of the Cursed Channel. Nevertheless, the dystopian 
imagination and political mythmaking connected to this channel were used after World War II to 
construct the image of a new communist utopia through the transformation of nature and 
society. Unravelling the dialectics of these utopian/dystopian imaginations of the hydrosocial 
landscape can provide new insights into political ecology and the history of water management, 
while the exploration of hydrosocial dystopias highlights the cycles of feedback between 
material and conceptual landscape transformations. The competing and periodically altering 
views of the Cursed Channel demonstrate that hydrosocial dystopias are not just transformative; 
they are also transformed by our visions. 
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Fig. 1. Location of the study area in Hungary. Source: the authors. 
 
Fig. 2. Timeline of water management in the Danube Valley  
in parallel with the biography of Lajos Dinnyés and key historical events. Source: the authors. 
 
 
 Fig. 3. Map of the territory managed by the Danube Valley Drainage and Irrigation Association.  
Source: the authors, based on B. Lupkovics, A Pestvármegyei Dunavölgy Lecsapoló és Öntöző Társulat 
Munkálatai és Jövő Feladatai, Budapest, 1941. 
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Fig. 4. The channel under construction, photographed by the engineer Brunó Lupkovics, 1926. Source: 
used with permission from the Danube Museum, Historical Image Collection, 24.630. 
COPYRIGHTED – SEE THE ORIGINAL PAPER 
Fig. 5. Photograph of Lajos Dinnyés, 1930s. Source: used with permission from the National Archives of 
Hungary, Dinnyés Lajos Miniszterelnök félhivatalos iratai, MNL OL XXXII-21. 
 
Fig. 6. Pump for flooding rice fields, Kunszentmiklós, 1949. Source: Fortepan On-line Photo Archive 
(www.fortepan.hu), original by M.E. Kovács, Creative Commons CC-BY-SA-3.0 licence. 
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Fig. 7. Drainage of the ‘tainted water’ of Lake Nagy-Csukás by one of the newly formed water management 
associations, with inhabitants of neighbouring villages attending the opening ceremony of a drainage 
channel, 1958. This channel was originally planned as a side channel of the DVCS, but had not been 
executed by then. Source: used with permission from MTVA, MTI Photo Archive. 
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Fig. 8. The Cursed Channel (Átok-csat.) named on the 1957 New Military Survey together with irrigated 
rice fields near Soltszentimre, site of a recent wetland restoration project (Kiskunság National Park 
Management Centre, http://knp.nemzetipark.gov.hu/a-soltszentimrei-szikes-puszta-elohely-
rekonstrukcioja-ii-utem last accessed 10 October 2017). Source: used with permission from 
Geoinformation Service of Hungarian Defence Forces (MH GEOSZ), Institute and Museum of Military 
History, Ministry of Defence (HM HIM), Military Topographic Survey (‘New Military Survey’), L-34-039-C-
b, 1:25000, 1957. 
